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Brazil’s Olympic-Era Anti-Corruption
Reforms
BY ANDREW B. SPALDING†

INTRODUCTION
A country once renowned for glorifying corruption now leads
what may be the furthest-reaching anti-corruption investigation in
history. Brazil, once typified by its “Brazilian jeitinho” way of
creatively navigating social problems,1 now executes “Operation Car
Wash,” bringing down political and business leaders by the dozens.2
So too has Brazil’s Congress adopted a series of dramatic, and
effective, new anti-corruption laws, in response to public outcries for
reform. It is deeply ironic, but not at all coincidental, that Brazil
concurrently hosted the Summer Olympics. This paper chronicles the
extraordinary series of events that connect – in a line that is straight
but certainly not obvious – Brazil’s modern anti-corruption movement
with its hosting of the 2016 Summer Games.
Brazil’s history gave rise to the Brazilian jeitinho and associated
systemic corruption.3 But after a 1988 constitutional revolution and an
era of soaring economic optimism, Brazil would pursue, and then win
in 2007 and 2009 respectively, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016
© 2017 Andrew Brady Spalding.
†

Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Portions of this article previously
appeared in a self-published ebook, OLYMPIC ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT: BRAZIL AND THE
RIO 2016 GAMES, available at law.richmond.edu/olympics. Many thanks to the several
students who helped write that book and this article, including Pat Barr, Albert Flores, Shaun
Freiman, Kat Gavin, Tyler Klink, Carter Nichols, Ann Reid, and Rina Van Orden.
1. Juliana Mello, The Brazilian Way of Doing Things, BRAZIL BUS. (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/the-brazilian-way-of-doing-things.
2. Brian Nicholson, Brazil’s Operation Car Wash, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=7960b146-65c4-4fc2-bb6ac6fbb434cd16.
3. Infra Part I.
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Summer Olympics.4 Immediately thereafter, an unforeseen series of
political and economic developments – including the Mensalão
corruption scandal, a sharp downturn in Brazil’s economic prospects,
and then the government’s increase in public transportation fares –
would spark public outrage over bad governance generally and
corruption specifically. These ultra-expensive sporting mega-events
became symbols of everything the people were protesting.5
As this article shows, Brazil’s public institutions would respond
in two dramatic ways. First, Congress adopted a series of four
important laws – here called the “Four Pillars” – that created a new
anti-corruption legal regime.6 Second, federal prosecutors would
launch “Operation Car Wash,” which utilized the new legal tools that
certain of those new anti-corruption laws created.7 The result is
beyond ironic: many of the very political and business leaders who
pursued the Olympic bid, benefited illicitly from the Olympic
preparation, and even helped to enact the new anti-corruption laws,
have been taken down in the reform movement they helped to create.
I. THE TRADITIONAL CULTURAL CONTEXT
Jeitinho is variously translated as the “little way out,”
“adroitness,”8 a “knack,” or even a “clever dodge” way of
accomplishing tasks.9 It can include “talking yourself out of a fine
when paying a bill late, jumping the queue if you see some
acquaintance ahead in the queue, or asking for a receipt with a higher
amount (than what you actually paid for) so that you can claim more
money back for expenses.”10 The Brazilian Jeitinho is described as a
uniquely “Brazilian way” of doing such things and is seen as integral
to the national identity of Brazil, “o pais do jeitinho” or “the land of
jeitinho.”11 One group of Brazilian scholars notes a general belief that
the Brazilian jeitinho “identifies Brazil as a nation” and is “central to
4. Infra Part II.
5. Infra Part II.A.
6. Infra Part III.
7. Infra Part III.D.1.
8. Peter B. Smith et al., How Distinctive are Indigenous Ways of Achieving Influence?
A Comparative Study of Guanxi, Wasta, Jeitinho, and “Pulling Strings,” 43 J. OF CROSSCULTURAL PSYCHOL. 135, 137 (2011).
9. Maria Cristina Ferreira et al., Unraveling the Mystery of Brazilian Jeitinho: A
Cultural Exploration of Social Norms, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL., (Dec. 5,
2011), at 331, 331.
10. Id. at 331.
11. Id.
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the collective psyche of a whole nation.”12
Jeitinho’s roots can be traced to Portuguese colonization, which
created a contrast between the highly hierarchical forms of social
control imported from Europe with a more native preference for
informal and affectionate social relationships.13 With the end of
colonization in 1822, the country would enter a century and a half of
often violent oscillations between highly decentralized and ostensibly
democratic but highly ineffective representative governments, and
highly centralized military dictatorships, neither of which tended to
elicit trust in government.14 This pendulum swung with particular
force in the late twentieth century. After a series of mid-century
ineffective governments the military seized control in 1964.15 The
military created a strong centralized government which stimulated
economic growth but was widely perceived as oppressive and corrupt.
The transformation occurred in 1988 with the founding of the modern
Republic of Brazil, a constitutional government founded on checksand-balances, separation of power, federalism, and the protection of
individual rights.16 This revolution would also sow the seeds of
Brazil’s modern anti-corruption movement.
But the many years of colonization, dictatorship, and highly
ineffective government had already given rise to jeitinho. The socalled “Brazilian dilemma” – between a native cultural preference for
informal, affective relationships and the impersonal, hierarchical, and
ineffective governments of colonization and military dictatorship –
helped to create this jeitinho, in which interpersonal strategies are used
to navigate through hierarchical governmental structures.17 Jeitinho
becomes “a typically Brazilian way to overcome bureaucracy” and
“break laws and norms to attain a certain objective.”18 Brazilians thus
learned how to beat the system, even at its own game.

12. Id. at 331.
13. Id. at 332.
14. See, e.g., ROLLIE E. POPPINO ET AL., BRAZIL, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2017), at
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/78101/Brazil/25036/.
15. HISTORY
WORLD,
HISTORY
OF
BRAZIL,
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?groupid=891&HistoryID=aa88
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
16. See, e.g., David V. Fleischer, Government and Politics, in BRAZIL: A COUNTRY
STUDY, (Rex A. Hudson ed.), Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1997; Keith S.
Rosenn, Separation of Powers in Brazil, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 839, 850–51 (2009).
17. Ferreira et al., supra note 10, at 332.
18. Id.

8_SPALDING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

BRAZIL’S OLYMPIC-ERA REFORMS

11/28/17 8:12 AM

191

Scholars, and particularly Brazilian scholars, have disagreed on
the extent to which jeitinho is synonymous with corruption. Brazilian
anthropologist Roberto DaMatta distinguishes between “positive
jeitinho,” which does not cause damage to others, and “negative
jeitinho,” which knowingly breaks the law and more closely
approximates corruption.19 Similarly, Professor Livia Barbosa sees a
distinction between “dar um jeitinho” (to have a way out) and “jeitinho
Brasileiro” (the Brazilian way out), where the former refers to
corruption while the latter refers to a creativity and pragmatism that do
not threaten social order.20 Another Brazilian scholar, Alberto Carlos
Almeida, found that Brazilians in the abstract tend to clearly
distinguish between three categories: jeitinho, favor, and corruption.
Favor implies reciprocity and is based on trust and does not involve a
violation of established laws or norms; jeitinho may be engaged in with
strangers, and involves only a minor infraction; while corruption
involves substantial material gain.21 Some scholars have found that a
spectrum exists within the minds of Brazilians, with favor at the
positive end, corruption at the negative end, and jeitinho somewhere
in the middle.22 But regardless of the cultural and intellectual appeal
of these clean academic distinctions, other scholars found through
interviews that Brazilians had trouble distinguishing between the three
in practical scenarios.23
Despite this legacy of colonization and dictatorships, Brazilians
hoped that winning and then hosting the Olympic Games would
announce a new era in Brazilian history. They were right, though
perhaps not at all in the way they expected.
II. WINNING THE OLYMPIC GAMES
The 2009 announcement that Brazil would be the first South
American city in history to host the Olympic Games was met with
large public gatherings celebrating the news.24 In what was then an era
of great optimism, the Olympics (in conjunction with the FIFA World
Cup) were expected to announce to the world Brazil’s arrival as a
19. Id.
20. Smith et al., supra note 9, at 137.
21. Ferreira et al., supra note 10, at 332–33.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Shasta Darlington, Brazilians Celebrate Olympics Bid in Rio de Janeiro,
CNN
(Oct.
2,
2009,
11:35
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/10/02/rio.celebration/.
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modern, developed, and capable country, and to stimulate Brazil’s
economic development. Carlos Roberto Osorio, Secretary General of
the Brazilian Olympic Committee, gave the following interview,
showing the depth of Brazilian optimism:
Our motivation to participate in this process is to take advantage
of an event like the Olympic Games to make a real difference in the
city and in the country, in various ways. First, in terms of the city of
Rio itself, [it is] the amount of investment in infrastructure that the
Games will bring to the city. Actually, Rio didn’t ask Brazil for money
to do many new things; we are accelerating existing processes.
Because of the time frame of the Games, things that would be done in
[twenty] years will be done in seven years. We are talking about metro
expansion, roads, airport renovation. So, the infrastructure of the city
will be transformed — and with that, the quality of life. Also, the
ability to attract additional investment. But, these are the tangible
[outcomes] of the story — and in our view, the smallest part of the
story. We are not shy to say that Brazil is a country that has social
problems. One of the biggest problems that we have is the inequalities
within our society. We view sports, and the Olympics Games in
particular, as an excellent tool to foster social integration, to foster and
to motivate young people to join sports, and [to make] Olympic values
[part] of their future lives. So the social legacy of the Games will be a
very, very important part of our project. Everything that is going to be
done in Rio [relates to] a vision of physical legacy – that’s very
important. But more important is this big opportunity to leverage
[social] programs that already exist, to foster integration within the
society, and to raise a younger generation to a better standard of living.
And sports is an excellent tool to foster education and to deliver this
legacy. So, we are very thrilled by the legacy potential. And I think
that’s one of the reasons that Rio was chosen.25
Promoters of the Olympics thus touted the Games as a way of
stimulating economic and cultural development. Indeed, winning the
FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympics would set a kind of highwater mark for Brazil’s confidence in its ability to govern. But the next
several years would bring about something of a confidence drought.
A. Brazil’s Olympic Seven-Year Itch
The Olympic Games are routinely awarded seven years in
25. Interview by Knowledge@Wharton with Carlos Roberto Osorio, Felipe Monteiro,
and Ken Shropshire, Brazil’s Gold: How Rio Won its Olympic Bid, (Mar. 3, 2010).
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advance, giving the host country sufficient time to prepare.26 But these
seven years in Brazil’s history would do much more than simply buy
time for infrastructure development. They would instead stimulate an
historic pivot in approaches and attitudes toward corruption.
Mensalão, Potuguese for “big monthly stipend,” was a bribery
scheme in which the Workers’ Party27 made secret payments t0
members of congress in return for supporting the party’s legislative
agenda.28 The scandal erupted in 2005 when an opposing party
member claimed the Workers’ Party was paying members of congress
30,000 reais a month (around $12,000 USD in 2005), and the money
had come from the public treasury by way of fake advertising contracts
entered into by state-owned companies.29 From the initial accusation,
the scandal spread to include bribery allegations against the state-run
postal system and extortion allegations against the Workers Party.30
The scandal eventually implicated numerous congressmen and Jose
Dirceu, then-Chief of Staff to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva.31
The Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil convicted twenty-five people
including top legislators, senior Working Party officials, businessmen,
and former president da Silva’s Chief of Staff; many were sentenced
to prison.32 In a country where the legal code offers extraordinary
protections to the political and financial elite,33 the event was a social
and legal turning point. It was a landmark case, being the first-time
high-ranking politicians were found guilty of corruption in a criminal
trial and served prison terms.34 Indeed, the convictions gave the
26. See generally, Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Games Candidature Process,
https://www.olympic.org/all-about-the-candidature-process (last visited May 15, 2017).
27. The Workers’ Party won the Brazilian presidency in 2003 with the election of Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva. Christopher Minister, Luiz Inacio Lulu da Silva, Brazil’s Progressive
President, THOUGHTCO. (Last updated July 2, 2014), https://www.thoughtco.com/luiz-inaciolula-da-silva-brazil-2136592 (last updated July 2, 2014).
28. Q & A Brazil’s ‘Big Monthly’ Corruption Trial, BBC (Nov. 16, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19081519; See H.J., infra note 32.
29. Chris Barrett, Mensalao: The Implications of Brazil’s Largest Corruption Scandal,
ARG. INDEP. (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/mensalaothe-implications-of-brazil%e2%80%99s-largest-corruption-scandal/.
30. H.J., The Economist Explains: What is Brazil’s “Mensalao”?, THE ECONOMIST,
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/11/economistexplains-14.
31. See Id.
32. Simon Romero, Key Brazilians in Graft Case Must Go to Jail, Court Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/world/americas/key-braziliansin-graft-case-must-go-to-jail-court-says.html.
33. Id.
34. See The Meaning and Implication of the “Mensalao,” Brazil’s Largest Trial on
Political Corruption, WILSON CTR. (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:00 AM to 12:00 PM),
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Brazilian people and international observers hope that the courts may
finally be able to keep corruption in check.35
So too would the economic mood change dramatically in those
years. As the lead-off letter in the famous BRIC acronym,36 optimism
swirled around Brazil in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
But economic conditions worsened dramatically in the 2010s. Global
commodity prices declined sharply, and President Dilma Rousseff
adopted a controversial policy of incurring substantial government
deficits to spend heavily on social programs and tax breaks for favored
industries. Though political support for her Workers Party increased,
the economy began to shrink, credit-rating agencies downgraded
Brazil’s debt to junk status, and the public’s optimism about both its
economic future and trust in the government’s ability to navigate
through economic challenges worsened significantly.37
Finally, in June 2013, the government’s proposed rate hikes in
public transportation incited protests and even riots in more than eighty
cities – Rio, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia, as well as Manaus, Recife, Belo
Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, and others.38 Numbering in the
hundreds of thousands, protestors voiced their concerns over not just
the public transportation rate hikes, but poor government and the cost
overruns of hosting the upcoming sporting events.39 As one
commentator put it, the protestors spoke out against “poor quality of
public services, lavish investment on international sporting events, low
standards of healthcare and wider unease about inequality and
corruption.”40 Protests continued into 2014, as so many of the
infrastructure projects promised for the dual mega-events of the World

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-meaning-and-implication-the-mensalao-brazilslargest-trial-political-corruption.
35. Romero, supra note 34.
36. Brazil,
Russia,
India,
and
China
–
BRIC,
INVESTOPEDIA
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bric.asp (last visited May 15, 2017) (referring to Brazil,
Russia, India, and China and “the idea that China and India will . . . become the world’s
dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services . . . while Brazil and Russia will
become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials.”).
37. See
Brazil’s
Fall,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
2,
2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684779-disaster-looms-latin-americas-biggesteconomy-brazils-fall.
38. Jonathan Watts, Brazil Protests Erupt Over Public Services and World Cup Costs,
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/brazil-protestserupt-huge-scale.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Cup and Olympics were scaled down, delayed, or cancelled.41
As a result, and in response to the diverse crises of the period
between winning and hosting the 2016 Games, Brazilian democracy
would do precisely what it was designed to do: adopt laws that the
people demanded.
III. THE FOUR PILLARS OF BRAZIL’S ANTI-CORRUPTION REFORMS
As public discontent mounted, Brazil’s Congress would respond
by enacting four distinct statutes, two of which were enacted in 2011
and two in 2013. They were, to varying degrees, enacted in response
to the public concerns about governance generally and corruption
specifically that arose on the eve of hosting the World Cup and
Olympic Games. The four pillars are: (1) the 2011 procurement
reforms, called the Regime Diferenciado de Contratações and known
as the RDC;42 (2) the 2011 freedom of information law that addressed
the government’s role in corruption by obligating agencies to make
information available to the public;43 (3) the 2013 Clean Companies
Act that addressed the corporate sector’s role in public corruption by
creating corporate liability for bribery, incentivizing cooperation with
government investigations, and incentivizing corporate compliance
programs;44 and (4) the 2013 organized crime bill which authorized the
enforcement tools that federal prosecutors would use in the Petrobras
investigation.45 This combination of anti-corruption laws – enacted in
41. Jonathan Watts, Fury and Frustration in Brazil as Fares Rise and Transport Projects
Flounder, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/06/brazilbus-chaos-fare-rise.
42. Law No. 12,462/11; Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on Brazil’s First Pillar:
Procurement
Reform,
FCPA
BLOG
(July
19,
2016,
6:18AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/19/andy-spalding-on-brazils-first-pillar-procurementreform.html.
43. Law No. 12,572/11; Conectas Hum. Rts., Transparency: Freedom of Information
Law Comes into Effect in Brazil Amid Climate of Distrust, Expectations, and Pressure, (May
30,
2012),
http://www.conectas.org/en/actions/justice/news/transparency-freedom-ofinformation-law-comes-into-effect-in-brazil-amid-climate-of-distrust-expectation-andpressure.
44. Law No. 12,846/13; GAN BUS. ANTI-CORRUPTION PORTAL, BRAZILIAN CLEAN
COMPANY ACT, at http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/anti-corruption-legislation/brazil
(last updated Nov. 2015).
45. Law No. 12,850/13; Antenor Madruga & Luciano Feldens, Brazil: White-Collar
Crime
Defense,
GLOB.
INVESTIGATIONS
REV.
(Aug.
8,
2016),
http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/the-investigations-review-of-the-americas2017/1067457/brazil-white-collar-criminal-defence; Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on
Brazil’s Fourth Pillar: The Organized Crime Law, FCPA BLOG (July 28, 2016),
fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/28/andy-spalding-on-brazils-fourth-pillar-the-organized-crime-
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such a short span and to such dramatic effect – has few historical
precedents.
These four pillars make for a stark contrast between the two BRIC
nations simultaneously hosting the FIFA World Cup and Olympic
Games back-to-back. In Russia – host of the 2014 Winter Olympics
and 2018 FIFA World Cup – allegations of corruption were rampant.
But we saw neither a credible legislative response, nor effective
enforcement actions. Russian corruption continued in impunity.46
Brazil, has addressed deeply-rooted public corruption with adopting a
four-part legislative framework and then a series of enforcement
actions.47 In so doing, Brazil is self-consciously addressing a culture
that once tolerated corruption and glorified jeitinho, seeking to move
beyond a history of official corruption bred under colonization and
military dictatorships. Brazil thus redeems Pierre de Coubertin’s idea
of the Olympic Games as a venue for promoting an ethic of
international fair play.48
This section will discuss the four pillars in order of their
enactment: first, the procurement reforms; then the freedom of
information law; the Clean Companies Act will be third; and finally,
the organized crime law.
A. The First Pillar: Procurement Reform
The harms of corruption in the specific realm of government
procurement are obvious to all. Government officials may be bribed
to accept bloated contracts, or inferior products, or both, all at the
public’s expense. But in trying to prevent corruption, procurement
presents a series of counterintuitive, and underappreciated, policy
trade-offs. The first trade-off is between transparency and cost.
Transparency is generally thought to be an antidote to corruption:
where processes are open to the public, and readily reviewable, the risk
of cost inflation would seem to go down.49 Put another way,
l.html.
46. See Ilan Berman, Putin’s Olympic Corruption, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/02/20/putin-olympics-sochi-corruptionrussia-column/5655815/.
47. Supra notes 43-45.
48. Pierre de Coubertin was the founder of the modern Olympic Games. Norbert Muller,
The Idea of Peace as Coubertin’s Vision for the Modern Olympic Movement: Development
and Pedagogic Consequences, SPORT J. (Mar. 7, 2008), http://thesportjournal.org/article/theidea-of-peace-as-coubertins-vision-for-the-modern-olympic-movement-development-andpedagogic-consequences/.
49. Transparency and Accountability are the Main Antidotes for Corruption, BARBADOS
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controlling corruption is a standard cost control mechanism. But as
the Brazilian experience has shown, sometimes transparency can
actually exacerbate cost inflation.50 In this regard, transparency can
cause the precise harm that anti-corruption measures are designed, at
least in part, to prevent. The relationship between transparency and
cost is thus not as simple as may first appear.
So too, in procurement as in government generally, do we suspect
that the concentration of power can give rise to corruption. We might
assume multiple companies working on a project would be better than
a single company with monopolistic control over the project; the
various companies might tend to keep each other in check, increasing
accountability and decreasing graft. But again, experience has shown
that multiple companies sharing responsibility in procurement projects
creates inefficiencies that tend to result in increased costs and delays.
Again, an effort to reduce corruption might increase costs to the public.
Brazil was keenly aware of these trade-offs, and of the challenges
inherent in its procurement regime, before the World Cup and
Olympics. But the mega sporting events became an impetus to
experiment with a new procurement regime.51 This new regime is at
least designed to make public procurement more streamlined and
efficient.52 The extent to which these efficiency-minded reforms will
create corruption risks remains to be seen.
Procurement is the acquisition of goods and services.53 In using
the term, some draw a distinction between public and private
procurement, and others define the term to include only acquisition by
a government entity.54 For the purposes of this paper, procurement
FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
26,
2008,
2:31
PM),
https://barbadosfreepress.wordpress.com/2008/02/26/transparency-and-accountability-arethe-main-antidotes-for-corruption/.
50. See The Brazilian Crisis: Lessons from an Emerging Economy, ONE BRIEF (Mar. 17,
2016), http://www.theonebrief.com/the-brazilian-crisis-lessons-from-an-emerging-economy/.
51. Renato Parreira Stetner & Paulo Henrique Spirandeli Dantas, Public Procurement in
Brazil PRAC. L. CO. (Mar. 1, 2013), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/0-5215566?__lrTS=20170402065602319&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&fir
stPage=true&bhcp=1.
52. Andy Spalding, Brazil Emerging, TRANSPARENCY INT’L BLOG (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://blog.transparency.org/2015/04/09/brazil-emerging/.
53. Procurement, Black’s Law Dictionary Free (2ND ed)., available at
http://thelawdictionary.org/procurement/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2017).
54. Allison Green, Difference in Public v. Private Procurement, CHRON,
http://work.chron.com/difference-public-vs-private-procurement-28985.html (last visited on
Apr. 17, 2017); U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR), (2005),
https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/current/far/pdf/FAR.pdf.
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refers to any acquisition by official Olympic organizing entities
whether public, private, or a combination of the two.55 For large scale
events or government projects, such as the Olympic Games,
procurement is typically accomplished through a regulated process that
requires potential suppliers of goods and services to bid against each
other with the goal of maximizing the quality of the good or service
offered while minimizing its cost.56
It is no secret that procurement is highly vulnerable to corrupt
practices.57 The 2004 OECD Global Forum on Governance identified
lack of transparency and lack of accountability as two of the major
threats to corruption in procurement.58 At all stages, issues like bribery
or kickback arrangements could present themselves. Further, as will
be discussed below, there are specific corruption risks unique to each
stage of the procurement process.59 While some are specifically
addressed in the Clean Companies Act,60 others are addressed by the
various procurement laws outlined here.61
Procurement generally consists of three distinct stages: (1) PreBidding, (2) Bidding, and (3) Post-Bidding stages.62 In the Pre-Bidding
stage, entities formulate their needs, the process they will use to meet
those needs, and the timeline that they will provide for the bidders to
place a bid.63 In the Bidding stage, entities open an invitation to bid and
after evaluating bids, offer an award, at least in theory, to the best
bidder.64 Finally, in the Post-Bidding stage, the awarding entity

55. As explained earlier, the governing bodies of the 2016 Olympics consist of both
public and private entities. See id.
56. See generally Nathan Munn, Olympic Procurement: Past, Present, and Future,
SourceSuite,
http://www.sourcesuite.com/procurement-learning/purchasingarticles/Olympic-Procurement-Past-Present-and-Future.jsp (last visited May 16, 2017).
57. Some, such as those in the OECD, believe that public procurement is the activity
undertaken by a government that is the most vulnerable to corruption. OECD PRINCIPLES FOR
INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, 9 (2009), www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994520.pdf.
58. Id. at 3.
59. See U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., PROCUREMENT FRAUD
HANDBOOK, 13–28 (Dec. 2012), http://www.gsaig.gov/?LinkServID=6486B647-A5DFC154-010A408470CAE0B8.
60. See infra Part III.C.
61. For more details on the Clean Companies Act, see generally Andy Spalding et al.,
3.14 Rio 2016 and the Birth of Brazilian Transparency, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT:
SPORT (2016).
62. OECD, Integrity in Public Procurement: Good Practice from A – Z, 21–25 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/38588964.pdf.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id. at 24.
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manages the contract with the bidder and completes payment. 65
The Pre-Bidding stage is generally the least susceptible to
corruption.66 At the Bidding stage, however, bidders may engage in
corruption by independently, or in concert with some or all of the other
bidders, attempting to influence the outcome of the awarding of the
bid.67 This can take the form of bid suppression, complimentary
bidding, bid rotation, or customer or market division.68 All of these
relate to an attempt to restrict competition and to cause the requestor
to pay more than it otherwise would.69
In the Post-Bidding stage, after the award has been granted,
corruption is often found in instances where costs run over or products
or services are not delivered.70 This is the stage where things such as
mischarging costs, charging for products or services that were not
delivered, and substitution of products or services -- particularly those
of an inferior quality – occur.71 These various stages of corruption risk
have been addressed in various Brazilian laws.
The first piece in Brazil’s Olympic procurement regime is the
Concessions and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are both
ways the government can award contracts to private entities to provide
a public service.72 Concessions are governed by law 8987/95
(Concession Law) and PPPs are governed by law 11.079/04, passed in
1995 and 2004 respectively.73 With both concessions and PPPs, the
government will delegate the provision of a public service during a
65. Id. at 25.
66. See generally id.
67. See generally id. at 24.
68. For further discussion on these forms of bid rigging, see OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 59, at 15.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id. at 17-22.
72. See generally Brazil’s Public-Private Partnership Law, BRASIL: A NATION FOR ALL
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-privatepartnership/sites/ppp.worldbank.org/files/ppp_testdumb/documents/brazilppplaw.pdf
(last
visited May 16, 2017).
73. Lei 8.987, de 13 de Fevereiro de 1995, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE:
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Agosto 1995 (Braz.); Lei 11.079, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004,
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Dezembro 2004
(Braz.); see also Henrique Frizzo & Pedro Oliveira, Public Procurement in Brazil: Overview,
WESTLAW
(Oct.
1,
2014),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2ef12a181ed511e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/Fu
llText.html?originationContext=knowHow&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextData=
%28sc.Default%29.
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fixed period of time.74 Practically, there is little difference between the
operation of the concession or the PPP; the main difference is the
source of funding for the project. When the government awards
concessions, the investment for the project comes from the private
entity.75 Conversely, when a PPP is awarded, the cost of the investment
is shared by the private entity and the public.76 A common example
would be the awarding of a company to construct and manage a tollroad on behalf of the government. Both Concessions and PPPs have
been granted in relation to the Olympic Games.
The second piece of the traditional Brazilian procurement regime
is the Brazilian Procurement Law 8666/93, which established the rules
and regulations for public procurement.77 The law applies to general
government procurement of services, goods, and construction, and
requires a two-step bidding process to complete a procurement
project.78 In the first step, the government extends a request for
proposal (RFP) for the creation of a technical project.79 A technical
project in this sense is a project that addresses the needs assessment,
planning, and budgeting phase of the Pre-Bidding stage of the
procurement project.80 This request is subjected to public bidding and
the best bid is given the award for the creation of the technical project.81
After the technical project is completed, the government then
moves to the second step of bidding which is again open to the public
and uses the technical project from the first step to determine the needs,
budget and other planning of the remainder of the procurement project.
In the case of the Procurement Law, bidding is open and transparent,
allowing others to see what bids have been in the past and see the bids
of their competitors once the bidding process has opened.82 Adding up
74. Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73.
75. INT’L L. OFF., Infrastructure Project and Feasibility Studies: Opportunities (July 14,
2015),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/ProjectsProcurement/Brazil/TozziniFreire-Advogados/Infrastructure-projects-and-feasibility-studiesopportunities#
76. Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73.
77. Lei 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: SUBOFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Junho 1993 (Braz.); see also Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73.
78. CONSTITIUÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22 (Braz.); Government
Procurement
Law
and
Policy:
Brazil,
LIBR.
OF
CONGRESS
(2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/govt-procurement-law/brazil.php#Constitutional
Principles;
see also lei 8.666, supra note 86.
79. Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73.
80. See generally OECD, supra note 71, at 21.
81. Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73.
82. Bids that have been made are submitted to the public in the Official Gazette. Lei
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the time limits for all of these different procedures, before the project
is even started, the time it may take can be between 180 days and 285
days, if the time limits are not exceeded due to legal disputes.83
The traditional Procurement Law has two features that, at first
glance, may appear to promote efficiency and accountability, but that
have created new and serious problems. The first concerned the prebidding and bidding stages. Under the Procurement Law, these bids
are solicited separately, and awarded to separate companies.84 The
company that is helping the government to design the project is thus
different from the company that builds the project. Though four eyes
are often better than two, the difficulty arises when the construction
phase encounters a problem. If the project, as designed and thus far
built, proves inadequate, and requires additional time and money to
complete, neither the firm that won the bid for the technical project nor
the firm that won the construction project wishes to accept the blame.85
Instead, each will point the finger at the other: the construction firm
will claim that the problem lies with the design, while the design firm
will attribute the problem to poor execution of a blameless plan.
Unable to settle, the two companies will proceed to litigate, obviously
causing delays and increased costs. Ultimately, the problem is that the
interests of the design firm, and the interests of the construction firm,
are not aligned; when trouble arises, each blames the other, and
allocating fault is slow, costly, and imprecise.
The second problem concerned the ironic tension between
transparency and inflation. The traditional Procurement Law followed
the practice of “open bidding,” in which the government publicly
announced the project’s budget before issuing its RFP.86 Open bidding
reflected the default assumption that transparency tends to limit
8.666, supra note 86; see also Government Procurement Law and Policy: Brazil, LIBR. OF
CONGRESS
(2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/govt-procurementlaw/brazil.php#Constitutional Principles (stating that “Article 21 of Law No. 8,666 mandates
that all notices with a summary of the public tenders must be published in the Official Gazette
and in newspapers with a large circulation”).
83. See generally Frizzo & Oliveira, supra note 73.
84. See generally Bruno Werneck et al., Construction and Projects in Brazil: Overview,
WESTLAW
(Oct.
1,
2016),
https://content.next.westlaw.com/4-5023377?__lrTS=20170409042129047&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&fir
stPage=true&bhcp=1.
85. See generally Mohd Nasrun Mohd Nawi et al., Impact of Fragmentation Issue in
Construction Industry: An Overview, MATEC WEB OF CONFERENCES 1, 1 (2014),
http://www.matecconferences.org/articles/matecconf/pdf/2014/06/matecconf_bsfmec2014_01009.pdf.
86. See generally OECD, supra note 62.
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corruption and costs.87 However, Brazilian experience proved the
opposite to be sometimes true. A bidder that is capable of bidding
substantially under the government’s budget might inflate the bid to
more closely approximate the available government funding.88 In this
way, open bidding tended to drive up costs.
The Regime Diferenciado de Contratações, law No. 12462/11 and
locally known as the RDC, is Brazil’s experiment with addressing the
inefficiencies with traditional procurement.89 So too was the law
passed to specifically address the procurement needs of the 2014
World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.90 The law is designed to
expedite the public procurement process because of massive
infrastructure projects that were undertaken and that are still underway
in Brazil.91 Put another way, Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup and
Olympics provided a catalyst to experiment with an alternative
procurement regime.
The law modifies the usual procurement process under the
Procurement Law in two ways relevant to this study. First, is allows
the government to conduct a single, integrated bidding process for both
the design and construction, combining the pre-bidding and bidding
phases.92 The construction bidding no longer depends on the existence
of an elaborate design already prepared by a separate design company
(who had won the bid in a prior bidding process). Instead, the
government will provide a general description of what it needs from
the project, and companies will simultaneously bid for the design and
87. See generally id.
88. Joseph Burns, Will Price Transparency Drive up Health Care Costs?, ASS’N OF
HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 9, 2013), http://healthjournalism.org/blog/2013/12/willprice-transparency-drive-up-health-care-costs/comment-page-1/ (speaking to the debate
around driving up costs in health care through price transparency; “‘[o]nce lower-paid
physicians see what higher-paid doctors are charging, lower-cost doctors will demand higher
rates from health insurers,’ thereby driving up premiums” (citing David Pittman,
Transparency: Big Data Sexy and Pricey, MEDPAGE TODAY (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PracticeManagement/Reimbursement/43236)).
89. Wagner Rosa da Silva, The Use of Sealed Bidding and Competitive Negotiation in
Brazil and Worldwide, GEO. WASH.: THE INST. OF BRAZILIAN BUS. & PUB. MGMT. ISSUES 1,
36
(Spring
2013),
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ibi/minerva/Spring2013/Wagner_Rosa_da_Silva.pdf.
90. Lei 12462, de 4 de Agosto de 2011, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE: SUBOFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Agosto 2011 (Braz.).
91. Rosa Da Silva, supra note 89, at 9-10 (stating that the RDC included infrastructural
development for the 2014 Olympics, such as public security and sports facilities, in addition
to current infrastructural projects, such as engineering services within the public school and
unified health systems).
92. See generally id.
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construction of the project.
Second, the RDC eliminates the requirement for open bidding. It
does not require the government to make its budget publicly available
before issuing the RFP.93 The government has the option of conducting
closed bidding, and not disclosing the budget, although the
government has to justify doing so.94 Many believe that this process
will produce better financial results for the government because the
lowest bidder will not allow its bid to creep up to be as close to the
budget as possible.
However, skeptics of the RDC are quick to point out that this
financial benefit comes at the apparent cost of transparency.95 The
instinct that transparency limits corruption, and secrecy exacerbates it,
is immediately triggered. Moreover, some critics believe that the most
powerful companies can use inappropriate influence to find out the
budget amount anyway; if this were true, secrecy would indeed be
compounding corruption. But research suggested that companies can
no longer expect to obtain that non-public information in closed-door
private meetings. The mores of Brazilian government are changing.
The RDC can be used for a limited subset of projects, including
the World Cup and Olympic Games. The mega-events were regarded
as a kind of experiment in this new procurement regime. Though most
Olympic projects did not use the RDC, the Olympics nonetheless
served as a catalyst for adopting this new regime. Leading
procurement professionals expect a post-Olympic dialogue on whether
the RDC did in fact constitute an improvement over the traditional
procurement system, and whether further reforms should be adopted.
B. The Second Pillar: Freedom of Information Law
Law No. 12.527/2011, widely known as the freedom of
information (FOI) law or information access law (its more common
moniker in Brazil), was perhaps the first major signal of the
government’s intention to enact meaningful anti-corruption law.96
93. Id. at 9.
94. Lei 12462, supra note 99.
95. Rosa da Silva, supra note 89, at 39 (stating that those who prefer open bidding take
into consideration anti-corruption measures—implying that the RDC trades efficiency for
transparency).
96. Lei 12527, de 18 de Novembro de 2011, PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE:
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Novembro 2011 (Braz.); Miriam Ventura, The Law on Access
to Information, Privacy, and Health Research in Brazil 636, 636 PERSPECTIVES (2013),
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/csp/v29n4/en_02.pdf.
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While perhaps the least prominent of the four pillars, it would prove a
precursor to the extraordinarily impactful statutes of 2013.
Based on the principle, “publicity as the general precept, and
secrecy as the exception,”97 the FOI law moves to an era of active
transparency, in which the government is obligated to publish certain
forms of information without a request.98 It brings an end to what
Brazilians called the “eternal secrecy,” in which public documents had
an indefinite period of confidentiality99 because highly classified
documents could see their classification renewed indefinitely.100
Indeed, when the FOI law was under consideration in Congress, some
lawmakers had pushed for keeping the “eternal” classification for
certain categories of documents – including nuclear and aerospace
technology, national defense, and diplomatic relations – but the
provision was ultimately defeated.101 So too did the bill create
controversy about the potential disclosure of military intelligence
concerning human rights violations during the military dictatorship.102
The FOI law has three core components. First, it obligates the
federal, state, and municipal governments, and all branches thereof, as
well as state-owned companies and even non-profits receiving
government funds, to publish various kinds of information, including
documents on government spending, without a request.103 These socalled “active transparency” obligations extend to the official contact
details of all employees, financial operations, spending, procurement
contracts, and answers to frequently asked questions.104 Second, the
law empowers any citizen to request information from the government
97. Greg Michener, Analyzing Brazil’s New Freedom of Information Law, OBSERVING
BRAZIL (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.observingbrazil.com/2011/12/13/analyzing-brazils-newfreedom-of-information-law/.
98. Marcelo Sarkis, Access to Public Information in Brazil: What Will Change with Law
No.
12.527/2011?,
FREEDOMINFO.ORG
(May
14,
2012),
http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/05/access-to-public-information-in-brazil-what-willchange-with-law-no-12-5272011/.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Rachel Glickhouse, Week in Review: Brazil’s Senate Passes Landmark Transparency
Laws, BRAZIL PORTAL (Oct. 31, 2011), https://brazilportal.wordpress.com/tag/freedom-ofinformation-law/.
102. Fabrizio Rigout & Camila Cirillo, Evaluating Readiness for the Implementation of
Open Government Systems: The Brazilian Case in Comparative Perspective, PLAN,
http://www.planbrasil.com/repositorio/arquivo/artigo/Rigout&Cirillo_EvaluatingReadinessF
orImplementation.pdf.
103. Sarkis, supra note 98.
104. Michener, supra note 97.
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and obliges the government to provide any such documents that are not
classified.105 Third, it reduces the terms of confidentiality of documents
designated as top secret, secret, and undisclosed for twenty-five,
fifteen, and five years respectively, and ends the possibility of renewal
of these periods.106
Preliminary data suggest that the Brazilian government is starting
to comply with the law, although patterns and attitudes will take time
to reform. According to one 2014 study, of all valid requests for
information under the new law, 40% were unanswered, 18% were
partially answered, and 31% received full responses.107 Of the partial
or full responses, 51% were deemed of good quality.108 Of eight
jurisdictions, Sao Paulo and the Federal Government had the best
response rates.109 Notably, the two worst jurisdictions were the city
and state of Rio de Janeiro.110
C. The Third Pillar: the Clean Companies Act
While the FOI law targets the public sector, the corporate sector
is the target of another statute. Passed in 2013, Brazil’s AntiCorruption Law, also referred to as the Clean Companies Act
(“CCA”),111 adopts a number of measures to increase corporate liability
and accountability, and to incentivize the growth of a compliance
industry and culture.
Brazil had a law on the books before the World Cup and Olympic
Games that prohibited official corruption; all governments do. But it
failed to create the corporate compliance culture that has proven in
other countries to be so critical to anti-corruption enforcement.
Enacted in 1992,112 the Administrative Improbity Law prohibits illicit
enrichment that arises from acts of administrative misconduct.113 Both
public officials and private individuals or entities that are a party to the
105. Glickhouse, supra note 101.
106. Rigout & Cirillo, supra note 102, at 4.
107. Gregory Muchener, Audit Indicates Weaknesses in Some Brazil Jurisdictions,
FREEDOMINFO.ORG (July 18, 2014), http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/07/brazil-mustchampion-foi-audit-indicates/.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Lei 12846, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, LOBO & IBEAS ADVOGADOS, Agosto 2013 (Braz.).
112. COLIN NICHOLLS ET AL., CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 652-53 (2d ed.
2011).
113. Id.
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illegal act may be subject to penalties under the law.114 The prohibited
acts include a wide variety of behavior that captures “any kind of
patrimonial advantage by reason of holding public positions,”
including direct or indirect economic advantages to act or not act in the
position’s official capacity.115 Public officials can also violate the law
by hindering or entering into a public contract without due process.116
While the Administrative Improbity law apparently covers any corrupt
acts of public officials, and places liability on both the government
agent and any private entity that was a party to the act, there remained
a gaping fundamental weakness: the statute created no corporate
liability.117 Because sporting events, such as the World Cup and
Olympic Games, involve corporations, this piece proves critical.
Accordingly, in response to the Mensalão scandal and public
protests, Brazil adopted the CCA.118 Indeed, the law marks an
important milestone in Brazil’s fight against corruption and was
intended by President Dilma’s administration to send a strong message
that the corruption tides have turned in Brazil.
The CCA’s essential prohibition is the promising, offering, or
giving of an “undue advantage” to a public official or third person
related to the public official.119 This provision mirror’s the bribery
prohibition in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s Anti-Bribery Convention, to which Brazil is a party.120
The statute also prohibits a number of other forms of corporate
corruption concerning public tenders, shell companies, and obstructing
public investigations of companies suspected of corporate
wrongdoing.121
114. Lei 8249, de 2 de Junho de 1992, art. 3., PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE:
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Junho 1992 (Braz.).
115. COLIN NICHOLLS ET AL., CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE 652-53 (2d ed.
2011).
116. Lei 8249, de 2 de Junho de 1992, art. 10., PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC CIV. HOUSE:
SUB-OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFF., Junho 1992 (Braz.).
117. Z Scott & Elizabeth Pozolo, Brazil’s New Anti-Corruption Law: What you Need to
Know, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 12. 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/02/12/brazilsnew-anti-corruption-law-what-you-need-to-k (stating that the implementation of Law 12846
led the development of corporate liability in Brazil).
118. See generally Kevin Roberts et al., The Brazilian Clean Companies Act – What You
Need
to
Know,
LEXOLOGY
(Dec.
6,
2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=183a9d32-0131-4f62-b72d-df28eb30eb5e.
119. Scott & Pozolo, supra note 117.
120. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.) at Ch. 11, Art. 5.1.
121. See generally id. at Ch. II, Art. 5.
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In comparison to the Administrative Improbity Act, and to
comparable anti-corruption laws in other countries, the CCA has a
number of noteworthy provisions. First, it moves beyond the
Improbity Act by prohibiting not just the bribing, but the solicitation
or offer of a bribe.122 This brings the act into conformity with the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention123 and obviously serves to prohibit a
much broader swath of conduct.
Second, the act imposes strict liability on corpotations for the acts
of employees.124 That is, when an employee commits a violation, the
company automatically becomes liable; the prosecutor need not prove
that the company intended, authorized, or even had knowledge of the
bribe independently of the employee.125 This is similar to the U.S.
model, but different from the U.K. In the U.S. owing to a longestablished principle of respondeat superior, the company is liable for
the acts of its employee as long as the employee was acting in the
course of employment (defined very broadly) and intended at least in
part to benefit the company.126 The U.S. statute, like Brazil’s CCA,
does not require proof that the company was also liable, independently
of whatever the employee did; if the employee did it while acting as an
employee, the company is also liable.127 Similarly, under the CCA a
company will be liable “for the wrongful acts . . . performed in their
interest or for their benefit.”128 The U.K., by contrast, has recently
provided companies a defense to liability for the acts of its employees.
If the company can prove that it had a good faith compliance program
in place – that is, that it took appropriate measures to prevent the
violation – but the violation occurred nonetheless, the company will
not be liable.129 Brazil’s CCA eschews the British approach,
122. GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Anti-Corruption Legislation: Brazilian Clean
Company Act, GAN INTEGRITY (Nov. 2015), http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/anticorruption-legislation/brazil.
123. See generally OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials
in
International
Business
Transactions,
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited June 15, 2017).
124. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.) at Ch. I, Arts. 1 & 2.
125. Id.
126. THE CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE SEC, A RES.
GUIDE TO THE FED. CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1, 27 (NOV. 14, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.) at Ch. I, Art. 2.
129. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (Eng.); see also Geoffrey Gauci & Jessica Fisher-Bristows,
The UK Bribery Act and the US FCPA: The Key Differences, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS. (June 1,
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containing an explicit provision holding companies strictly liable.130
Though time will tell, this will likely mean that a company is liable no
matter what the company did or did not do, apart from the employee.
Thirdly, the statute makes clear that companies owned by the
government – typically called state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) - are
deemed an extension of the government, such that these companies’
employees are public officials.131 In the U.S. context, for example,
whether employees of SOEs are foreign officials was a matter of much
dispute, as the statute did not explicitly address the question. Only in
2011 did the U.S. courts resolve the question, holding just as the CCA
now does that SOE employees are to be treated as officials.132
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statute imposes two
forms of liability on companies: civil and administrative.133 Notably,
the statute does not impose criminal liability on companies, but this is
not inappropriately lenient, much less scandalous. Though the U.S.,
U.K., and many other jurisdictions around the world hold companies
criminally liable, many (such as Germany) do not.134 And indeed,
corporate criminal liability is a relatively new phenomenon in the
history of law. International conventions such as the OECD AntiBribery Convention require signatory states to hold companies liable
in accordance with their underlying principles of law, recognizing that
some jurisdictions simply do not recognize the criminal liability of
corporations.135 The CCA should not be thought as somehow less
effective in this regard.
The CCA’s penalty provisions are especially strong; companies
may even say severe. The penalty is to be calculated as a percentage,
up to 20%, of the gross earnings in the company’s most recent fiscal
year preceding the onset of enforcement proceedings.136 Note what the
2011), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/UKBAFCPA.cfm?makepdf=1.
130. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.) at Ch. 2, Art. 5.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 931–32 (11th Cir. 2014), superseded by
statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9).
133. See Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
2.8.2013 (Braz.) at Chs. III & IV.
134. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1481, 1493–94 (2009).
135. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 3,
Dec. 17, 1997, 105 UST 1997.
136. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
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statutory penalty is not. First, it is not calculated based on the amount
of the bribe, as some might assume; a bribe of relatively modest
proportions could give rise to a substantial penalty. Second, it is not a
function of the earnings that resulted from the bribe. In the U.S., for
example, a company’s financial penalty for foreign bribery is
calculated based on the profits made possible by the bribe(s).137 The
CCA, by contrast, disregards both the size of the bribe and the size of
the profits made possible by the bribe. Finally, note that this statute
does not calculate profits based on annual profits, but rather, annual
gross earnings. Accordingly, a company that is losing money – that is,
one that has no annual profits – can still be fined. Where the bribes
proved to be bad business, and became a losing proposition, the
company may nonetheless be fined. So too may the company be
debarred, or prohibited from conducting further business with the
government, and in some circumstances may even be dissolved.138
1. Overview of the U.S. System – to Understand the CCA
To understand the CCA’s enforcement-side provisions, a brief
overview of the U.S. system is helpful. Though Brazil does not appear
to be emulating the U.S., it is trying to build a system that now exists
in the U.S. and has proven central to anti-corruption enforcement.
Federal anti-corruption laws in the U.S., particularly anti-bribery
laws, are enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice and, to a lesser
extent, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.139 These
agencies out of necessity have limited budgets. The principal aim of
public anti-corruption enforcement is to maximize general deterrence
– to prevent persons within their jurisdiction from committing similar
acts. While specific deterrence refers to preventing recidivism – the
defendant’s repeated violation – general deterrence refers to
preventing persons other than the defendant from committing similar
violations. Accordingly, the U.S. enforcement agencies seek to
maximize general deterrence while operating on a fixed budget. It
might be said that they are looking for the maximum general deterrence
return on the dollar.
(Braz.) at Ch. 3, art 6.1.
137. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 69 (2012).
138. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.) at Ch. 6, art 19.
139. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, supra note 137, at 2.
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One way – the traditional way -- to achieve both specific and
general deterrence is to bring wrongdoers to trial. If convicted, the
defendant company would face a stiff penalty and considerable
reputational damage through the negative press. However, trials
present two challenges for the enforcement agencies. First, they are
extremely resource-intensive, as the gathering of evidence (discovery)
and resulting trials are notoriously drawn-out and expensive,
consuming vast amounts of the enforcement agencies’ time, money,
and personnel. Second, because they are so resource intensive, the
agency can try a relatively small number of companies. As a matter of
simple math, because each company requires so much time to
investigate and try, and assuming fixed resources, the agencies cannot
try as many companies as they could if the trial process were
substantially shorter than various legal and practical circumstances
presently permit. Finally, a trial is unpredictable; the government can
rarely be sure that, after all the time and money spent on trying a
company, it will actually get a conviction. Accordingly, the U.S.
Department of Justice realized that trials are no way to maximize the
general deterrence “bang for the buck.”140 They would get relatively
few companies, with unpredictable results.
Meanwhile, criminal trials in particular are likewise a losing
proposition for the defendant company. The company feels the drain
on resources, as key personnel are distracted from their regular duties
and high-priced corporate litigators rack up billable hours. The
unpredictability of trials is a major down side to the defendant
company: they may get an acquittal, but so too may they get a
conviction with an unexpectedly severe penalty. Finally, trials will
generally produce negative press for a company, harming their
reputation and, for public companies, their stock value. Even if
ultimately acquitted, the reputational damage can be very hard to
overcome.
Accordingly, as U.S. anti-corruption enforcement has increased
over the last decade, so too has the use of alternatives to trial.141
Increasingly, U.S. enforcement authorities are proposing, and
companies are accepting, an alternative form of investigation and
settlement. Indeed, in the U.S., with anti-bribery law in particular,
140. Id. at 52.
141. See Anti-Corruption Enforcement: What to Watch in 2016, Covington, Global AntiCorruption Group (Covington, D.C.), Feb. 2016, at 1. See also Steven A. Tyrell et al., AntiCorruption Enforcement Review: Emerging Issues and Developments, Litigation Department
(Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, N.Y.), June 30, 2015 at 1.
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trials against corporate defendants are nearly unheard of.142 Rather, the
U.S. Department of Justice and the corporate defendants agree to
resolve the allegations by a different route.
This alternative route has four core components. The first is the
investigation stage. When an allegation of wrongdoing arises, either
within a company or publicly, the company may not wait for the
government to catch wind of the suspicions and begin to investigate
the company. Rather, the company will often conduct its own
investigation into its own potential wrongdoing. With an “internal”
investigation, typically for lesser alleged offenses, the company will
conduct the investigation in-house. When the misconduct is largerscale, more systemic, or where the in-house lawyers are potentially
implicated, the company may conduct an “independent” investigation.
Here, the board of directors will retain an outside law firm, one that
has not previously represented or been affiliated with the company, to
conduct a factual investigation into the wrongdoing and formulate
conclusions concerning what wrongdoing may have occurred, the
liability the company may face, and which steps the company should
take in terms of internal governance and the retaining or firing of
implicated personnel. That law firm does not represent the company,
and is not advocating on behalf of the company, but neither does it
represent the government. Rather, it is an independent third party, with
no loyalties to either side of the prospective dispute, seeking an
impartial account of the facts. Either way, when the investigation is
complete, a substantial factual record, and a report summarizing the
factual and legal conclusions, will be compiled. That report is left in
the company’s possession.
The second core feature of modern U.S. anti-bribery enforcement
concerns what happens next – that is, what happens with the report.
The company has now spent millions, or tens of millions, on an
investigation into its own wrongdoing, and possesses a comprehensive
report with supporting documentation. Needless to say, the U.S.
Department of Justice would like to get its hands on the report.
Accordingly, it offers to the company “cooperation credit.”143 By the
terms of this deal, if the company hands over the investigation’s
142. See Corporate Bribery: The Anti-Bribery Business, THE ECONOMIST May 9, 2015
(stating that more than four-fifths of FCPA cases have been settled since 2010, and only one
trial has been commenced against a public company in 38 years).
143. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecutionbusiness-organizations.
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findings, and makes its employees available to further interviewing,
and otherwise cooperates with the government, the government will
offer a penalty that, it claims, is substantially less than what the
defendant would likely get if convicted at trial.144 The company now
must make a decision. It can risk the unpredictability of a trial, with
its exorbitant costs, substantial drain on company resources, and
undoubtedly negative press. Or, it can accept the government’s offer
of cooperation credit and turn over to the government the results of its
investigation, buying itself a reduced penalty, predictability of
outcome, reduced lawyer’s fees, and reduced negative press.
Invariably, companies select the latter route: they choose to
cooperate.145 The turning over of its investigation conclusions is
widely referred to as “voluntary disclosure:” the company voluntarily
discloses the results of its findings.146 The return for voluntary
disclosure is the cooperation credit. Notably, the government cannot
force companies to accept this deal, and yet the companies invariably
do. It is perceived to be in the interests of both parties.
This deal culminates in the third core feature of the U.S. anticorruption settlement process: the deferred prosecution agreement
(DPA) or nonprosecution agreement (NPA).147 DPAs and NPAs are
forms of settlement, in which the government agrees to either defer
prosecution or to forego prosecution altogether in exchange for the
company accepting certain terms of settlement. The terms will include
a penalty and might also include disgorged profits, the termination of
various personnel, the withdrawal of business from the problematic
markets, or acceptance of a government-imposed monitor.148 Under a
DPA, the government in effect gives the company a trial period in
which to demonstrate its compliance with the law and the settlement
terms; DPAs are agreements between the enforcement agency and the
defendant; they do not involve judicial oversight.149 With a NPA, by
contrast, a judge will sign off on the agreement, but with minimal
oversight.150 The difference does not prove terribly important. DPAs
144. Id.
145. Corporate Bribery: The Anti-Bribery Business, supra note 142 (analyzing the costs
of FCPA litigation for companies and the number of companies that choose to cooperate with
federal authorities).
146. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 143.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 74 (2012).
150. Id. at 75.
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and NPAs are two minor variations of the basic negotiated settlement.
The fourth unique component of this enforcement procedure
concerns the role of compliance programs. Compliance programs are
designed to prevent violations of given laws through training,
monitoring, and the maintenance of an appropriate company culture.151
With respect to a given area of federal law – be it environmental, health
care, or in our case, anti-corruption – a company that knows itself to
be at risk may invest in compliance to varying degrees. Of course, it
may not invest at all, liking its chances that it will not violate the law
or, at least, will not get caught. It may create a mediocre compliance
program, and may or may not work to support that program by creating
a culture within the company that values compliance. Or, the company
may take compliance seriously, investing in a first-rate program and
taking substantial effort to back up those programs with company
culture.
The U.S. Department of Justice wishes to incentivize the growth
of compliance programs, and will therefore reward companies for
quality programs in several different stages of enforcement. First, the
government may decide not to investigate a company at all.152 Though
these decisions are not public, practitioners take for granted that, given
the Department of Justice’s limited resources, one factor it may
consider in deciding whether to investigate a company at all is whether
it had a quality compliance program in place at all. Second, the
Department of Justice may investigate a company but then decide not
to penalize it. That is, the DOJ does not find sufficient reason to
penalize the company. A formal decision not to penalize a company
is called a declination, and while these too are rarely public, the
government has recently publicly declined to penalize a small number
of companies based at least in part on the quality of the company’s
compliance program.153 Finally, when the DOJ does find sufficient
evidence of culpability to enter into a DPA or NPA with the company,
a quality compliance program can lead to a penalty reduction, as

151. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 143.
152. Criminal Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Enf’t Div. of U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, supra note 149, at 55.
153. See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 161; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former
Chief Executive Officer of Oil Services Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charge
(June 15, 2015) (on file with author); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan
Stanley Managing Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by
FCPA (April 25, 2012) (on file with author).
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authorized by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.154
Brazil’s CCA introduces a U.S.-type enforcement regime into
Brazilian anti-corruption enforcement.
Though necessarily
announcing that it is eschewing or even discouraging traditional trials,
multiple provisions of the CCA are designed to foster the growth of an
enforcement regime based on self-investigation, voluntary disclosure,
and cooperation credit through settlements.
First, the CCA contains a list of enumerated factors that the
government will consider when determining appropriate sanctions.155
The first six provisions of Chapter III, Article 7 are predictable and
rather unremarkable: (1) the seriousness of the offense, (2) the
advantage gained by the illicit conduct, (3) whether the illicit act was
completed, (4) the degree or risk of damage, (5) the adverse effect of
the conduct, and (6) the offending company’s economic
circumstances.156 However, the next two provisions are harbingers of a
new enforcement era. Article 7.VII provides that penalties will be
determined in part based on the “cooperation of the legal entity in the
investigation” of the wrongdoing.157 This is cooperation credit. The
next provision, Article 7.VIII, provides that penalties will also be
based on the existence of internal procedures designed to promote
integrity, including but not limited to auditing, whistleblowing, and
self-enforcement of the codes of ethics and conduct.158 These are all
features of what the west (or north, as it were) calls a compliance
program.
Additionally, the CCA authorizes the relevant enforcement
agency to enter into what the statute calls “leniency agreements.”159
These agreements are analogous to the U.S.-style DPAs and NPAs, but
perhaps more aptly named. Unlike the U.S. terminology, the term
“leniency agreement” makes its purpose more explicit: to be lenient
on the defendant in exchange for the defendant’s cooperation. The
CCA establishes several requirements that a defendant company must
meet if it is to be entitled to a leniency agreement; these requirements
are much more specific, and perhaps more exacting, than anything seen
154. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 143.
155. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.) at Ch. 3, art 7.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.at Ch. V.
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in the U.S. system.160 Requirements companies must meet include:
collaboration must result in identification of the guilty individuals; the
rapid exchange of information; the legal entity must have initiated the
cooperation; the entity must completely discontinue its involvement in
the investigated wrongdoing; the entity must fully admit its
participation in the wrongdoing; and fully and completely cooperate
with the investigation until its conclusion.161
The CCA is thus a bold effort to stimulate the growth of a new
corporate enforcement climate – where companies invest in
compliance programs, where they investigate their own potential
misdeeds, and where they will cooperate with the enforcement
agencies to efficiently negotiate settlements.
D. The Fourth Pillar: The Organized Crime Law
Of the four pillars, Brazil’s new organized crime statute, passed
in August 2013, is perhaps most remarkable, both for its impact and
for the circumstances that led to its enactment. The statute provides a
definition of organized crime and authorizes a number of law
enforcement methods to investigate and prosecute organized crime.
The federal prosecutors’ use of these tools led to the Petrobras scandal,
discussed in this section.
The bill was supposedly proposed to go after organized crime
(e.g. drug trafficking, etc.) generally and specifically to target a group
of violent protestors known as the Black Bloc.162 During the early
stages of congressional consideration of the bill, there was no mention
that these enforcement tools could, or would, be used to go after highlevel officials and businesspersons engaged in graft; but, word on the
street is that advocates pushing for adoption of this bill may well have
understood its potential to convict the very politicians who would vote
to support the bill.163
Of the organized crime laws various enforcement tools, two have
160. Id.
161. Lei 12846 de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 2.8.2013
(Braz.).
162. Wearing black disguises, the Black Bloc became more organized and visible in the
2013 anti-corruption protests, engaging in vandalism and theft. See generally Lulu GarciaNavarro, Brazil’s Black Bloc Activists: Criminals or People Power?, NPR (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/22/239860341/brazils-black-block-activists-criminals-orpeople-power (discussing how the Black Bloc became more organized and visible in the 2013
anti-corruption protests, engaging in vandalism and theft).
163. Spalding, supra note 45.
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proven of particular significance to anti-corruption enforcement. First,
the law provides an obstruction of justice charge; specifically, a person
who obstructs investigations is subject to the same punishment range
as one who promotes, constitutes, or finances a criminal
organization.164
Second is the expanded plea bargain. Though plea bargaining
previously existed under Brazilian law, it was much more restricted
and thus a much less effective tool in the prosecutor’s arsenal. Under
the previous regime, judges could only reduce the penalty by one to
two thirds, or grant a pardon post-conviction if the judge determined
that the defendant’s cooperation was useful to the conviction.165 A
defendant could thus not be sure, at the time of confession, of the plea
bargain’s effects on his or her conviction and sentence. Laws that
previously governed plea bargains include the Heinous Crimes Law
(8.072/1990),166 the Law on Economic and Tax Crimes, and Against
Consumer Relations (8.137/1990),167 the Law on Crimes Against the
Financial System (7.492/1986, as amended by Law 9.080/1995),168
Law 9.269/1996, which altered Article 159 of the Penal Code (on
extortion with kidnapping),169 the Money-Laundering Law
(9.613/1998),170 the Cooperation and Witness Protection Law
(9.807/1999),171 and the Law on Combating Drug Misuse
(11.343/2006).172
The new organized crime law goes significantly further. It does
164. Lei 12850 de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.8.2013
(Braz.).
165. Delmanto Advocacia Criminal, Introducing Plea Bargaining: A Uniquely Brazilian
Approach,
International
Law
Office
(Dec.
16,
2013),
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/White-Collar-Crime/Brazil/DelmantoAdvocacia-Criminal/Introducing-plea-bargaining-a-uniquely-Brazilian-approach.
166. Lei No. 8.072 de 25 de Julho de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
7.26.1990 (Braz.).
167. Lei No. 8.137 de 27 de Dezembro de 1980, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
12.28.1990 (Braz.).
168. Lei No. 7.492 de 16 de Juhno de 1986, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
6.18.2013 (Braz.) (amended Lei No. 9.080 de 19 de Juhno de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 7.20.1995).
169. Lei No. 9.269 de 2 de Abril de 1996, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 4.3.1996
(Braz.).
170. Lei No. 9.613 de 3 de Marco de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
3.4.2013 (Braz.).
171. Lei No. 9.807 de 13 de Julho de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
7.14.2013 (Braz.).
172. Lei No. 11.343 de 23 de Agosto de 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
8.24.2006 (Braz.).
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not merely provide for a sentence reduction or eventual pardon.
Rather, it allows the prosecutor to not bring charges at all under certain
circumstances.173 Specifically, a prosecutor or judge may grant
complete impunity, or reduce a penalty by up to two thirds, for a
defendant who has effectively and voluntarily cooperated with the
investigation, provided that the cooperation produces one of five
results: (1) the identification of other participants in the crime; (2)
information on the structure and control of the criminal organization;
(3) the prevention of additional criminal activity by the organization;
(4) the complete or partial recovery of the criminal proceeds; or (5) the
location of the victim.174 So too may the prosecutor dismiss the
complaint against the defendant if he or she is not the leader of the
criminal organization and is the first member of that organization to
enter into a plea agreement with the enforcement authorities.175
1. A Corruption Investigation that Reaches the Olympics
The obstruction of justice charge and the enhanced plea bargain
under Brazil’s new organized crime law made possible what may be
the largest anti-corruption prosecution in history: Petrobras.176 Former
Petrobras executive Paulo Roberto Costa, who was arrested in March
2014 for involvement in a separate money-laundering probe, accused
more than forty politicians of participating in a vast kickback scheme
designed to benefit the Brazilian oil giant between 2004 and 2012.177
He alleged that the participants received as much as 3% of the value of
contracts signed between Petrobras and the Brazilian government in
exchange for favorable votes in the legislature.178 Prosecutors would
eventually uncover a scheme of money laundering, drug trafficking,
tax evasion, foreign exchange evasion, and smuggling valued at $3
billion USD.
This author’s interviews with Brazilian prosecutors disclosed that
the organized crime law of 2013 made this prosecution possible.179
Costa was at first questioned about a minor violation, and was
173. Lei No. 12.850 de 2 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
5.8.2013 (Braz.).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Joe Leahy, What is the Petrobras Scandal that is Engulfing Brazil?, FIN. TIMES
(March 31, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/6e8b0e28-f728-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Interview with Brazilian Prosecutors, Public Prosecutor’s Office, in Porto Alegre,
Brazil. These interviews were conducted by the author (Interview notes on file with author).
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reportedly revealing little of what he seemed to know. Prosecutors
then used their new tool – an obstruction of justice charge – which they
threatened against both Costa and his family if he did not disclose
further information. The threatened obstruction charge flipped Costa
and broke open “Operation Car Wash.”180 Prosecutors have also made
liberal use of their new plea bargaining authority, again authorized by
the organized crime bill; as of March 2017, sixty-five plea deals had
been signed.181
Most significant for the Olympics is the central role of Brazil’s
major construction companies, which obviously figured prominently
in preparations for the World Cup and Olympics. These construction
companies were funding the political parties’ campaigns in exchange
for illicit benefits in the bidding of construction projects, including but
not limited to World Cup and Olympic venues.182 At the time of
publication, well over a hundred persons had been convicted and over
sixty had signed plea deals with the Ministério da Justiça.183
Most of the people who signed the plea deals are executives or
former executives and former directors of big construction
companies.184 For example, Clóvis Peixoto Primo, former president of
the construction company Andrade Gutierrez, said in his deposition
that he paid bribes to the former Rio de Janeiro governor, Sergio
Cabral, and the owner of the Delta construction company, relating to
the Maracanã Stadium renovation.185 Augusto Mendonça, Toyo Setal
executive, said in his deposition that between 2008 and 2011, he paid
around $15 million USD to the former Services Director of
Petrobras.186 Claudio Melo Filho, former director of institutional
relations of Odebrecht, showed in his depositions the values that were
given to fifty-one politicians of eleven political parties for the purpose
of getting illicit benefits to the construction company.187 These
politicians included the president of the Senate, Renan Calheiros and

180. Id.
181. Delatores
da
lava
jato,
POLITICA
(April
4,
2017),
http://especiais.g1.globo.com/politica/2015/lava-jato/delatores-da-lava-jato/.
182. Adriano Belisario, Documento da Lava Jato sugere cartel na Olimpiada, PUBLICA
(Apri 29, 2016), http://apublica.org/2016/04/documento-da-lava-jato-sugere-cartel-naolimpiada/.
183. Delatores da lava jato, supra note 181.
184. Id.
185. Delatores da lava jato, supra note 181.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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current Brazilian President, Michel Temer.188 Other executives or
former executives and former directors of large construction
companies that signed plea deals, include Eduardo Hermelino Leite,
former Vice President of Camargo Correia;189 Hamylton Pinheiro
Padilha Junior, former representative of Vantage Drilling Corp;190 and
João Carlos de Medeiros Ferraz, former President Director of Sete
Brasil.191 As an example of how impactful these plea deals became,
Odebrecht would eventually enter into a $3.5 billion USD settlement
with authorities in Brazil, the U.S., and Switzerland for paying bribes
around the world.192
“Operation Car Wash” would eventually bring the Olympic
Games within its snare. The most expensive construction project
undertaken for the Games was the $2.5 billion USD revitalization of
the port region of Rio de Janeiro, known as “Port Maravilha.” 193 The
Car Wash investigation has uncovered a suspicious payment of
$300,000 to a code name “Turquesa 2.”194 The Engenharia and OAS
construction firms are also implicated and under investigation for
participation in the project.195 This particular scheme allegedly
involved then-President of the Brazilian House of Representatives,
Eduardo Cunha, who received around $700,000 USD to provide the
construction companies special tax breaks in relation to the Olympic
construction.196
Not surprisingly, on the eve of the Games, 63% of Brazilians
surveyed thought hosting the Olympics would hurt the country.197
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Delatores da lava jato, supra note 181.
192. Richard L. Cassin, DOJ and SEC Take Small Slice of Odebrecht-Braskem $3.5
Billion Global Settlement, FCPA BLOG (December 21, 2016, 1:18PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/12/21/doj-and-sec-take-small-slice-of-odebrechtbraskem-35-billion.html.
193. Guilherme Costa & Vinicius Konchinski, Lava Jato aponta propina em 2a obra mais
cara
da
Olimpiada,
UOL
(March
22,
2016),
https://olimpiadas.uol.com.br/noticias/2016/03/22/lava-jato-aponta-propina-em-2-obra-maiscara-da-olimpiada-de-2016.htm.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Paulo Roberto Conde, Para 63% dos brasileiros, Olimpiada vai trazer mais prejuizos
do que beneficios, UOL (July 19, 2016), http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/olimpiada-norio/2016/07/1793059-para-63-dos-brasileiros-jogos-vao-trazer-mais-prejuizos-do-quebeneficios.shtml.
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There is some evidence to suggest they were right. Six months later,
the New York Times would run a jarring article entitled “Legacy of Rio
Olympics So Far is Series of Unkept Promises,”198 detailing the
economic waste and incomplete projects left in the Olympics’ wake.
CONCLUSION
The promises of the Olympic Games’ economic benefits may
well have been unkept. But the Olympics delivered, perhaps
inadvertently, a different sort of good. As the public decried the megaevent’s waste, Brazil’s democratic institutions would respond most
remarkably. With four new statutes and a dramatic enforcement
action, corruption would be identified and prosecuted to a degree
unseen in the history of Brazil and, quite possibly, the world. It was
the Games’ unintended benefits, rather than anything predicted or
planned, that may constitute Brazil’s Olympic legacy.

198. Anna Jean Kaiser, Legacy of Rio Olympics So Far Is Series of Unkept Promises, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/sports/olympics/rio-stadiumssummer-games.html?_r=0.

